

## **REMARKS**

This amendment responds to the Office Action dated August 5, 2005 and the interview conducted with the examiner on December 8, 2005 relative to the parent case Serial No. 09/916,397, filed July 27, 2001. A three (3) month extension of time is filed concurrently herewith. Please charge Deposit Account no. 03-1231 for the \$510.00 fee.

In the Office Action dated August 5, 2005, the examiner:

(A) issued a double patenting rejection (see pages 8-12, para. 8-15) based upon Serial Nos. 09/916,397; 10/008,218; 10/155,525; 10/155,192; 10/277,196; and 10/390,807. Applicant owns all these applications. Applicant requests that the Examiner suspend this double patenting rejection until an allowable set of claims is approved. Applicant will consider filing terminal disclaimers as necessary.

(B) rejected all claims 1-73 (see Office Action on pages 2-8, paragraphs 2-7) as being non-patentable in view of certain prior or pre-existing technology or art disclosed in the following references:

U.S. Patent No. 6,078,907 to Lamm (PRIMARY REFERENCE)

U.S. Patent No. 6,598,161 to Kluttz

U.S. Patent No. 5,036,315 to Gurley

U.S. Patent No. 5,532,950 to Moses

The 1996 book, Applied Cryptography, by Schneier (attached to Office Action)

The Uniform Resource Locator article "FOLD OC" (attached to Office Action)

In the parent case, Serial No. 09/916,397, the Examiner had earlier rejected the patent claims in light of Kirshenbaum '298 (U.S. Patent No. 6,602,298), Lamm '907 and/or Fahlman '080 (U.S. Patent No. 5,960,080). Kirshenbaum '298 and Fahlman '080 were cited in a rejection in the parent case. At the interview on December 8, 2005, the examiner indicated that a proposed claim (to "multi-level security") was patentable and distinct over the cited references but also indicated that an additional search was necessary.

In this case, independent claims 1, 29, 47, 72 and 73 have been amended to refer to "respective extract stores" in the preamble of the claims and to "storing said subsets of extracted data and said remainder data in said ~~extract store~~ respective extract stores and said remainder store, respectively." See claim 1. It is respectfully submitted that the amended claims 1, 29, 47, 72 and 73 all include the concept that various levels of secret data are stored in "respective extract stores" and this is essentially the same as multiple levels of security with multiple levels of secure storage. This concept conforms to the interview on December 8.

In summary, Kirshenbaum '298, Lamm '907 and/or Fahlman '080 do not show, teach or suggest multiple extractions of security sensitive words related to each of a plurality of security levels, and separate storage of those security sensitive words in different secured locations for each security level (multiple extract stores), and the requirement that the user input a password ("security clearance") for each security level.

The advantages of the multiple security level - multiple dispersal and storage claim are:

- distributed, secure storage of multiple levels of secure data
- less risk of loss of secure data by attacks (intrusions) due to the dispersed storage of data

- system provides more physical barriers to electronic intrusions into storage sites
- avoids single point of machine-security clearance failure (possible with prior art systems)
- enhances the greater sharing of data by granular separation and dispersed storage of data at multiple levels of security

**Kirshenbaum '298** does not show separate storage of secured data, separate and apart from unsecured data. Both secured and non-secured data is stored in a single database 14. Col. 3, lines 40-44; col. 5, lines 7-10 ("The data set is stored in a database ... the document comprises secure portion and non-secure portions"); col. 5, lines 36-37 ("to retrieve those secure and non-secure portions of the document and to send the retrieved portions of the document to the output device.").

Kirshenbaum '298 does not have storing said remainder [non-secret] data in said remainder store. Kirshenbaum '298 teaches away from this claimed aspect of the invention.

Kirshenbaum '298 does not show extraction of multiple levels of secured data from a document. At best, Kirshenbaum '298 discloses scanning and identification of identifying codes but the identifier codes are not secured data. "In a particular embodiments, the processor is configured to identify a security clearance level of a user and then to enable the user to print portions of a document at any security level below the user's level." Col. 5, line 54. "The identifier codes printed on non-secure portions of a document are machine readable ... and are provided to a processor by extracting the identifier codes from the machine readable format with a scanning machine." Col. 5, line 64 - Col. 6, line 1.

The present invention requires multiple security levels, each having a sub-set of security sensitive words, extraction and storage of multiple security levels, a plurality of predetermined security clearances, a particular security clearance needed to open said extract stores for full or partial reconstruction of data.

In the present invention, different security clearances must be input to permit reconstruction with each extract store (each security level storage facility) in order to obtain the data and permit full or partial reconstruction only in the presence of respective security clearances. Therefore, the present invention requires multiple extraction, each extraction for each security level, separate storage thereof, storage of the remainder or non-secured data, and, permitting full or partial reconstruction of said data via said extracted data and remainder data only with predetermined security clearances.

**Fahlman '080** does not show, teach or suggest a remainder store for non-secured data, multiple security levels, multiple extraction of security data, storage of multiple levels, presentment of different security codes at each security level. In fact, nowhere does Fahlman '080 discuss password or security clearance control.

In Fig. 1, step 111 of Fahlman “automatically” merges sensitive information into non-sensitive information. In FIG. 2, step 217, the Fahlman system again “automatically” merges secured data with unsecured data. Fahlman discusses merging secured data with unsecured data at col. 2, line 22, col. 2, line 34, and col. 2, line 49, and col. 2, line 54 and col. 2, line 40. Fahlman '080 discloses identifying security information and extracting that information and replacing it with place holders. Col. 2, line 37 and col. 3, line 47. “The sanitized message is then transmitted with a low level of security.” Col. 3, line 54. The sensitive information is stripped from the original message and stored in a separate location or together with the sanitized message. Col. 3, line 64. A map showing the location of the security information is also stored with the secured information. Col. 3, line 63. “Then, in step 111, the sensitive terms received from the second path are merged with the sanitized message to create a final confidential message.” Col. 4, line 1. The examiner should note that Fahlman does not discuss reconstruction or merger in the presence of

any type of security clearance. In contrast, the present invention requires multiple security clearances, each unique to a security level. Fahlman also discusses: “Then, in step 217, the sensitive terms are automatically merged back into the serviced message to create a final message.” Col. 5, line 27. No discussion of multi-level security clearance is noted. The same is true regarding merger of security information and non-secured information at col. 6, line 62.

Fahlman does not seem to store remainder or non-secure data in a separate remainder store location apart from secure data. Fahlman (1) identifies secret words, (2) replaces the words with placeholders, then (3) transmits the “sanitized message.” Fig. 1, step 107, Fig. 2, step 209, col 2, line 19, col. 2, line 34, col. 2, line 49, col. 3, line 54 (transmission - no storage of non-secure data), col. 4, line 64 (transmission - no separate storage). Fahlman does discuss storing the sanitized message, that is, the non-secure data and the placeholders, but not separate storage of the remainder data. Col. 3, line 63, col. 4, line 47, col. 5, line 1. In the present invention, remainder, non-secret data is stored separately from secret data. See claim 63, “storing” step. Fahlman teaches away from this aspect of the present invention.

Fahlman does not discuss multiple security levels nor multiple storage sites at each security level. Since multiple security levels are not addressed in Fahlman, multiple security clearance codes to obtain access and reconstruct the secured data levels is not discussed. Since Fahlman does not use any type of password or security clearance procedures, there is no need for a plurality of predetermined security clearances to reconstruct said data from multiple extract stores only in the presence of said predetermined security clearances.

There is no motivation nor suggestion to combine Kirshenbaum’s presentment of a security code with Fahlman’s single level extraction and storage of secret data. There is no suggestion nor motivation

to use security codes to reconstruct “full or partial” data from respective extract stores in the presence of such security codes.

Lamm ‘907 stores and has multiple copies of all secret-secured data about the consumer in three (3) different computers, to wit, consumer computer 12 (see legends FIG. 2, consumer computer 20, col. 5, line 48), billing - processor computer 26 (see col. 13, line 5) and enrollment server 21 (see col. 9, line 42). The three computers in Lamm ‘907 provide an integrated bill payment system which cannot be deconstructed into operable components. In contrast, the present invention extracts secured data, for multiple security levels, and then stores the extracted data in extract stores. Lamm’s process of storing secret data in three computers is completely different than the claimed system of storing secret data in multiple, extract stores for respective security levels.

Because Lamm ‘907 stores secret and non-secret data in multiple locations, Lamm teaches away from the basic concept of the entire invention, that is, secure, dispersed, distributed storage of data, which can only be “reconstructed” under several password controls.

First, Lamm ‘907 does not have a single remainder store for non-secure data. Lamm does not have separate storage of secret data, separate and apart from non-secret data.

In Lamm ‘907, the non-secret or non-sensitive data is transmitted via Internet 28 and is merged with secret data by all three computers completely independent of each other, operationally or otherwise. In other words, a 1<sup>st</sup> user on consumer computer 12 can reconstruct the data with secret and non-secret data without a security code (col. 12, line 10), <sup>1</sup> completely separate and apart from 2<sup>nd</sup> user on billing -

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<sup>1</sup> “This information from the secured billing information database 38 can appear on the reconstructed bill 154 even though it was not sent with the non-sensitive billing information to the

processor computer 26 (col. 9, line 62).<sup>2</sup> The claimed invention uses multiple secret-extract stores which store different data. To reconstruct a singular document, 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> users must access the same extract store at the same security level.

In Lamm '907, there is no plurality of predetermined security clearances get data from respective ones of said extract stores because the secret data is stored locally at all locations. Lamm does not require nor need to present a security code prior reconstruction with multiple extract stores. Since the secret data in Lamm is on all three computers, there is no need to present a security code clearance, nor is there a need to present multiple security clearances to use data form respective extract stores. Lamm does not reconstruct data with predetermined security clearances because each computer locally stores secret data and non-secret data thereon.

The prime purpose of Lamm '907 is as follows: "A primary consequence of this distinction is that billing messages 18 are prepared and sent by the processor server computer system 26 to the electronic post office 16 with redacted content only. Similarly, payment instruction messages 19 are prepared by consumer computer 12 and sent to the electronic post office 16 with redacted content only." Col. 6, lines 25-32. Lamm is not concerned with (a) extraction, (b) secure storage of extracted data at multiple levels, (c) full or partial reconstruction with multiple extract stores and predetermined security clearances. Lamm does not require a high level of security because the security objective of Lamm '907 is limited to protection

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consumer's computer 12, because it is stored locally on the consumer's computer 12. An encryption program 36 may be used on the consumer's computer 12 if data sent from the processing computer system 20 is encrypted." Col. 12, lines 36-43 (emphasis added).

<sup>2</sup> "As noted earlier, an authentication identifier, such as an EPO-mail address supplemented by a password [sent by the consumer], is set up to allow the processor or billing party to receive payment instructions from a consumer without the transfer of secured billing information." (col. 9, line 62)

of the sensitive information while the information travels the internet or phone wires. Lamm does not consider the storage at the three computers unsafe because it does not even require a password to access that secret information.

A combination of Kirshenbaum '298, Lamm '907 and/or Fahlman '080 would result in a three headed monster with no discernable utility. No reference specifically discusses separate storage of non-secret, remainder data, apart from secret data. No reference shows, discusses or suggests multiple security levels and multiple stores for each level of security. Lamm stores secret data and non-secret data locally on many computers. Kirshenbaum stores all data, secret and non-secret, in one location. Fahlman extracts only a single level of data and stores it separately from the non-secure data (which is transmitted, not stored "in a remainder store" as per the claimed invention) but never discusses password control to reconstruct with multiple extract stores. It is respectfully submitted that it is improper to select disparate parts from each of these complicated systems and "cobble together" the claimed invention. There is no suggestion nor motivation to do so absent the disclosure of the present invention.

Each of the references, Kirshenbaum '298, Lamm '907 and/or Fahlman '080, describe complete systems and there is no reason to add to or substitute portions of one disclosure with another. For example, there is no reason to combine Lamm's bill paying system with Kirshenbaum's singular document storage and reproduction system and/or Fahlman's secret transmission system.

With respect to Schneier's book (Applied Cryptography), Schneier does not show, teach or suggest multi-level extract stores nor predetermined security clearances, nor reconstruction of said data via multiple extract stores only in the presence of said predetermined security clearances. Schneier discusses encryption and key destruction.



Kluttz '161 does not show, teach or suggest multi-level extract stores nor permitting reconstruction of said data via said extract data stores only in the presence of predetermined security clearances. Kluttz '161 shows utilizing multiple encryption portions in a singular document. See Abstract and FIG. 3. The keys are maintained in the document 100. Col. 6, lines 28-30. FIGS. 5 and 6 show the flowcharts for document decryption which includes utilizing the encryption key in the document itself (step 304, FIG. 5; step 404, FIG. 6). There is no suggestion of utilizing an extracted store and a remainder store.

Contrary to the examiner's understanding of Kluttz '161, the disclosure does not show different levels of security for subsets of information. It discloses "dividing the document into at least a first portion having a first security level and a second portion having a second security level" and then encrypting these two levels differently. There is no different storage of different secure information with different password keys for each level, AND separate storage of remainder, non-secure data.

U.S. Patent No. 5,036,315 to Gurley does not cure the defects identified above with respect to Lamm '907 and the differences with respect to the present invention. Gurley does not show, teach or suggest (a) filtering data; (b) utilizing multiple extract stores and a remainder store; (c) multiple security clearances for the extract stores; and (d) permitting reconstruction of said data via the multiple extract stores only in the presence of predetermined security clearances. Gurley '315 discusses a video display control which accepts and processes two (2) video signals, one displayed in a defined window of the second video display.

Applicant respectfully requests that the examiner approve the patentability of claims 1 - 73.

Respectfully submitted,

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